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Summary / Abstract
Undeployed charitable assets in donor-advised funds 
(DAFs) reached $121.4 billion in 2018—including 
$33.9 billion at Community Foundations. Most of these 
undeployed funds are invested in conventional financial 
instruments. However, DAFs present a unique oppor-
tunity to promote impact investing into the local com-
munity, including Community Development Financial 
Institutions (CDFIs) that serve their local communities. 
In addition to having already expressed a clear interest 
in using funds for social purposes, DAF donors could 
potentially realize a double-bottom-line benefit by plac-
ing undeployed funds in impact investments rather than 
traditional stocks or bonds. Community impact invest-
ing should be an appealing option for DAF donors at 
Community Foundations. The donor has already relin-
quished any possibility of personal benefit from the funds 
in their DAF, and should therefore be interested exclu-
sively in maximizing the social impact they can generate 
with their funds. Lending the money to a social interest 
project or organization for a few years while the donor 
decides where to grant the funds seems like a rational 
strategy to achieve greater impact. A substantial body of 
evidence from the field of behavioral economics suggests 
that most people do not, however, make rational decisions 
about their investments or finances. Instead, a variety of 
cognitive biases tend to drive their decisions, often result-
ing in sub-optimal financial outcomes. 
In this study, DAF donors were invited to complete a 
survey by the local community foundation that held their 
investment. In the survey, the donors were asked to imag-
ine that they had just contributed a sum of money to their 
donor-advised fund. The survey then asked the donors 
to determine how they wanted to invest their funds 
before they were granted out to charitable organizations. 
Donors were given four options, allocating between them 
a percentage of their funds. Donors could then select the 
desired term and interest rate for their investment in the 
local community impact fund. The results suggest that 
Community Foundations can exert considerable influ-
ence over donor allocations to community impact invest-
ing funds simply by changing how they frame the request. 
In particular, if Foundations are willing to recommend a 
default allocation to community impact investments—
even while allowing the donor full choice over the final 
allocation that is actually implemented—they will see  
substantially more funds going to this use. 
Background
The National Philanthropic Trust estimates that 
undeployed charitable assets in donor-advised funds 
(DAFs) reached $121.4 billion in 2018—includ-
ing $33.9 billion at Community Foundations.1 It is 
believed that most of these undeployed funds are 
invested in conventional financial instruments. But 
DAFs present a unique opportunity to promote impact 
investing. In addition to having already expressed a 
clear interest in using funds for social purposes, DAF 
donors could potentially realize a double-bottom-line 
benefit by placing undeployed funds in impact invest-
ments rather than traditional stocks or bonds. With 
DAF annual payout rates sitting at 20 percent, a dollar 
in a DAF has an expected life of 5 years during which 
it could be invested for community good before being 
donated to a charitable organization. Yet only a small 
fraction of DAF donors have made any impact invest-
ments despite significant efforts on the part of many 
DAF sponsors to offer impact investing opportunities. 
Donor-advised fund sponsors, including community 
foundations, have also expressed concerns over the 
time and expense that it requires to educate and advise 
DAF donors about impact investing.2
On its face, impact investing should be an appeal-
ing option for DAF donors. The donor has already 
relinquished any possibility of personal benefit 
from the funds in their DAF, and should therefore 
be interested exclusively in maximizing the social 
impact they can generate with their funds. Lending 
the money to a local project or intermediary, such 
as a Community Development Financial Institution 
(CDFI), for a few years while the donor decides 
where to grant the funds seems to us like a rational 
strategy to achieve greater impact. As one donor put 
it to us, “What really matters to me is that our funds 
actually help make things better in our community.” 
Another donor agreed, saying “I feel strongly that 
funds intended to be given away should do good 
while sitting in an advised fund before they are given 
away. [Funds] should be invested 100% for impact.” 
Furthermore, depending on the interests of the donor, 
investing undeployed funds on the stock market 
might actually run counter to their impact goals. As 
another donor expressed to us, “I don’t want to be 
donating to, say, public health and environmental 
causes while investing in Philip Morris and Exxon.”
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To be sure, there are arguments to be made against 
impact investing. Some DAF donors feel that there 
exists an “obligation to the [eventual grant] recipients 
to keep up with market performance at the lowest risk,” 
as one put it. In a similar vein, another donor argued, 
“One of my reasons for having a donor advised fund is 
to put the money into professionally managed accounts 
that would likely yield a higher return than I could on 
my own, thereby increasing my ability to impact the 
community.” Other donors might be skeptical about 
whether an impact investment will generate the prom-
ised investment. Or, they might have a philosophical 
opposition to activities to be funded by the investment 
(“I have found impact investing to be associated with 
certain left-wing ideologies,” declared one presumably 
conservative donor).  Possibly, the majority of DAF 
holders have made a careful, informed decision not 
to place funds in impact investments, based on one or 
more of these lines of argument. 
On the other hand, it is also possible that many 
donors simply have not fully thought through their 
choices, and are even underinvesting in impact invest-
ments relative to what they might choose upon more 
thorough reflection. Consider these statements that we 
heard from donors when asking them about how they 
would like to allocate their DAF funds:
• “I don’t have a desire to control the investment 
strategy. (In fact, the opposite: I don’t want to  
have to think about it.)”
• “I’m not knowledgeable enough to make an 
informed decision and I haven’t thought about 
what my investment objectives should be.”
A substantial body of evidence from the field of 
behavioral economics suggests that most people 
do not, in fact, make rational decisions about their 
investments or finances.3 Instead, a variety of cogni-
tive biases tend to drive their decisions,4 including the 
inertial effects we see in our study.5 These cognitive 
biases can result in sub-optimal financial outcomes 
relative to people’s expressed preferences. Bhamra 
and Uppal (2019) find that investors tend to suffer 
from “familiarity biases,” investing in a few assets 
with which they are more familiar, with the result that 
they hold under-diversified portfolios.6 Beshears et al. 
(2007) find that simply changing the default option for 
worker participation in their retirement program (to 
automatic enrollment where the worker can opt out) 
dramatically changes participation rates.7 Even invest-
ment professionals suffer from cognitive biases. For 
example, Cen et al. (2019) find that financial analysts 
are impacted by anchoring biases (a sort of cognitive 
over-dependence on an initial piece of information) in 
assessing the future profitability of firms.8  
There is also a body of work in the philanthropic 
space that shows how behavioral nudges and cogni-
tive strategies influence charitable giving. Kamdar et 
al. (2015) find that the way charitable organizations 
frame their requests can have a substantial impact on 
giving.9 These “nudges” can vary based on the goals 
of the charitable organization, and not all methods 
are likely to work in all circumstances.10 Regardless, 
charitable giving is an economic activity, and there is 
every reason to believe that DAF donors are subject 
to the same cognitive biases as other economic deci-
sion makers.11 Up to this point, however, very little 
research has been done on this topic. As a result, DAF 
sponsors are currently operating without an under-
standing of how behavioral finance may influence the 
potential demand for impact investing and to effec-
tively market impact investing opportunities. 
Study Design
We designed a simple experiment to see whether 
DAF donors’ choices of how to invest undeployed 
funds can be influenced by behavioral “nudges.”12 For 
the purpose of this study, we define a “nudge” as a 
change in how donor choices are presented, with the 
intention of increasing the percentage of undeployed 
funds that donors designate for community impact 
investments. Importantly, these nudges do not restrict 
choice for the donors (they can choose any allocation 
of funds to community impact investments, including 
zero), nor do they change the underlying incentives 
to invest (there are no special rewards provided for 
donors allocating funds for impact investing). 
The experiment worked as follows: DAF donors were 
invited to complete a survey by the local Community 
Foundation that held their investment. In the survey, 
the donors were asked to imagine that they had just 
contributed a sum of money to their donor-advised 
fund. The survey then asked the donors to determine 
how they wanted to invest their funds before they were 
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granted out to charitable organizations. Donors could 
select among four options, allocating a percentage of 
their funds between the following options:
• A conventional, actively managed portfolio with 
broad exposure to global equity and fixed-income 
markets
• A mix of low-cost, passively managed stock and 
bond index funds
• A “socially responsible” portfolio invested in a 
mix of stock and bond funds that utilize envi-
ronmental, social and governance factors in the 
security selection process, and/or actively engage 
with companies to promote social responsibility 
among companies in which the fund invests.
• A “Local Community Impact Fund” described to 
donors as a fund investing “in a range of non-
profit and social purpose organizations that serve 
the community where you live.”
Donors could then select the desired term and inter-
est rate for their investment in the local community 
impact fund.
Without their knowledge, donors responding to the 
survey were randomly selected to be placed into one 
of four different groups. Each group received a slightly 
different presentation of the Local Community Impact 
Fund investing option:
• The baseline group received the following addi-
tional explanation about the Local Community 
Impact Fund: “These investments may help to 
grow businesses in low-income communities, 
develop health care centers and grocery stores in 
areas that lack them, build affordable housing, 
or help low-income families to build or repair a 
home, buy a car to get to work, or pay for educa-
tion. This fund is intended to return capital over 
time with only modest financial gain.”
• The second group received a more emotional 
appeal utilizing stories about recipients of 
investments made by the Local Community 
Impact Fund—for example, about a single 
mother working as a home health care aide who 
would benefit from the construction of new 
affordable housing that she could rent. We will 
refer to this framing of investment choices as 
the “storytelling approach.”
• The third group received the same description of 
the options as the baseline group. However, the 
survey had a set of numbers already entered in the 
table where respondents chose how to allocate their 
investments. Specifically, 40 percent of invest-
ments were selected to go to the Local Community 
Impact Fund, and 20 percent to each of the other 
options. Respondents were able to edit percent-
ages to whatever allocation they preferred. The 
survey text above the table read, “We have recom-
mended an allocation for your consideration that 
we believe balances the need for local investment 
by the foundation and its donors with the need to 
generate sufficient returns to maintain future grant 
distributions over one’s lifetime, but you may edit 
the percentages as you wish.” This option could 
thus be described as anchoring the respondent to 
the initial value of 40 percent assigned to the Local 
Community Impact Fund—and as putting the 
weight of a recommendation from their local com-
munity foundation behind that initial value. We 
will refer to this framing of investment choices as 
the “recommended allocation” approach.
• Finally, the fourth group received the same 
description of the options as the baseline group, 
with one piece of additional information about 
the Local Community Impact Fund: “Community 
impact investing is a growing trend in the United 
States and increasingly, many high-net-worth 
individuals, family offices, and leading founda-
tions are dedicating a significant portion of their 
assets to place-based community investing.” We 
will refer to this framing of investment choices as 
the “norming” approach (sharing information to 
establish impact investing as a social norm). 
Two community foundations—the Seattle 
Community Foundation and the Grand Rapids 
(Michigan) Community Foundation—agreed to 
participate in the study and sent a neutrally-worded 
invitation to the survey to their donors during the 
fall of 2019. We received 195 total survey responses, 
141 from Seattle and 54 from Grand Rapids. 
Respondents were roughly evenly distributed across 
the 4 different versions of the survey—49 for the 
baseline approach, 43 for the storytelling approach, 
54 for the recommended allocation approach, and  
49 for the norming approach.
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A major limitation of the study is that survey respon-
dents were being asked hypothetical questions about 
an investment allocation—not to actually choose an 
investment allocation of real dollars. 
Study Results
On average, respondents in the baseline survey group 
chose to allocate 18.5 percent of their investments to 
the Local Community Impact Investment Fund. This 
result is interesting in and of itself, as it suggests a level 
of interest in community impact investing that is greater 
than what has been achieved to date.
We observe powerful impacts on donor allocations to 
the Local Community Impact Investment Fund for the 
“recommended allocation” approach. Simply by making 
a suggestion to respondents—a suggestion that respon-
dents could readily opt out of, and with nothing more 
than a mildly-worded recommendation to back it up, this 
approach generated a 59 percent increase in the funds 
allocated to the Local Community Impact Investment 
Fund, compared to the baseline. The result was highly sta-
tistically significant (t = 2.86, p <.01 for a two-tailed test). 
We also observe a modest bump in allocations to 
the Local Community Impact Investment Fund for 
the other two “nudges”—the storytelling approach 
and the norming approach—but in these cases, the 
results are not statistically significant.
TABLE 1. SUMMARY OF COMMUNITY IMPACT INVEST-
MENT ALLOCATION DECISIONS BY SURVEY GROUP
Survey Group Mean allocation 
to Community 
Impact Fund



















We find that donor demographics are signifi-
cant predictors of the amounts they will allocate to 
impact investing. Donors who are female, younger, 
and who have smaller amounts in their DAFs all 
tend to allocate larger amounts to impact investing, 
as seen in Table 2.
TABLE 2. DEMOGRAPHIC DIFFERENCES 
Demographic  
comparison
Mean allocation to 
Community Impact 
Fund
 T score for 
comparison 
P value for 
comparison 
(2-tailed)
Men vs. women 16.9% for men; 
29.1% for women
3.25 0.001
Donors 65 and 
older vs. donors 
younger than 65
17.2% for seniors; 
27.0% for donors 
under 65
2.70 0.008
Donors with under 
$500,000 in DAF 
vs. donors with 
$500,000 or more
14.9% for large 
donors; 24.8% for 
small donors
2.68 0.008
To control for possible effects of demographic differ-
ences between survey groups, we run an OLS regression 
to compare the baseline and recommended allocation 
approaches, including control variables for the gen-
der, age, and DAF holdings of the respondents. Due to 
small sample sizes we reduce the age and DAF hold-
ings variables to dichotomous variables (donor is under 
65 or 65 or older; donor has less than $500,000 in the 
DAF or over $500,000). We find that all variables save 
gender continue to be statistically significant, and the 
magnitude of the effect of the recommended allocation 
approach remains the same after controlling for these 
donor characteristics. Regression output is presented in 
Table 3—“Anchoring” refers to whether the respondent 
received the “Recommended Allocation” language.
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Conclusion
The results suggest that Community Foundations can 
exert considerable influence over donor allocations to 
community impact investing funds. In particular, if the 
Foundations are willing to simply recommend a default 
allocation to community impact investments—even 
while allowing the donor full choice over the final 
allocation that is actually implemented—they will see 
substantially more funds going to this use. 
We anticipate that investment advisors at DAF spon-
sor organizations might resist such an approach, with 
two particular sources of reluctance. First, the invest-
ment advisors might argue that principles of good 
financial stewardship require that DAF funds should be 
invested for maximum financial return, regardless of 
impact. We would argue in response that these invest-
ment advisors themselves might be suffering from 
what behavioral economists would call a “status quo” 
cognitive bias—in the investment world, most funds 
are typically invested in conventional stock and bond 
funds, with an eye only to financial risk and return. But 
just because funds for other goals (such as retirement) 
are managed in this way, should the same thinking 
really apply to funds for which the donor has already 
explicitly prioritized their social impact? 
Second, the investment advisors might object to 
the use of behavioral “nudges” to influence donor 
behavior, either claiming that “donors know best” 
or that it would be unseemly for a DAF sponsor to 
TABLE 3. REGRESSION OUTPUT
attempt to influence their choices. This general class 
of objection is frequently encountered in behavioral 
economics and is addressed by Thaler and Sunstein 
(2003).13 First, the assumption that DAF holders 
are making rational, informed decisions about their 
investments that best meet the goals they have set 
for their funds and need no help to make better 
decisions is questionable at best, given the behav-
ioral finance literature. Second, a decision not to 
make any recommendation on how to invest unde-
ployed DAF funds still represents an active decision 
on the part of the DAF sponsor, with known conse-
quences for how funds will be invested. It is there-
fore incumbent upon the DAF sponsor to reflect 
carefully on what it truly believes is the socially 
optimal allocation of funds. Finally, it is important 
to recognize that strategies such as recommending 
an allocation of funds for impact investing do not in 
any way coerce the donor into a decision. The donor 
is still free to decide how to allocate their funds—the 
difference is only in what the default option looks 
like. Again, given the fact that DAF funds have been 
explicitly designated for social impact, it is hard to 
reconcile such a goal with a default investment allo-
cation to conventional stocks and bonds.  
Variables:
• Dependent variable is the 
percentage of DAF funds al-
located to a Local Community 
Impact Investment Fund
• Anchoring: = 1 if respondent 
received recommendation for 
community impact investment 
allocation; = 0 if respondent 
was in baseline group
• Senior: = 1 if respondent was 
65 or older, 0 otherwise
• Genderflag: = 1 if respondent 
was male, 0 if female
• Fund500k: = 1 if respondent’s 
DAF had $500,000 or more in 
assets, 0 otherwise
  6 C A R S E Y  S C H O O L  O F  P U B L I C  P O L I C Y
E n d n o t e s
1. National Philanthropic Trust (2019). The 2019 DAF Report. 
Online at: https://www.nptrust.org/reports/daf-report/
2. There are also legal considerations. See Levitt, David 
(2014). “Impact Investing Through a Donor-Advised Fund.” 
Adler & Colvin. https://www.adlercolvin.com/wp-content/
uploads/2017/12/Impact-Investing-Through-a-Donor-
Advised-Fund.pdf 
3. See, for example: Tim Richards (2014). Investing Psychology: 
The Effects of Behavioral Finance on Investment Choice and 
Bias. Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.; Michael 
Pompian (2006). Behavioral Finance and Wealth Management. 
Journal of Financial Economics, 2011, Vol. 102(1): 1–27. 
4 Ritter, J. R. (2003). Behavioral finance. Pacific-Basin 
Finance Journal, 11(4), 429–437.
5. Burton, E., and Shah, S. (2013). Behavioral Finance  
(1st edition). Wiley.
6. H. Bhamra and R. Uppal (2019). “Does Household Finance 
Matter? Small Financial Errors with Large Social Costs.” 
American Economic Review 2019, Vol. 109(3): 1116–1154.
7. Beshears, Choi, Laibson, and Madrian (2006). “The 
Importance of Default Options for Retirement Savings 
Outcomes: Evidence from the United States.” National 
Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 12009.  
https://www.nber.org/papers/w12009.pdf
8. Ling Cen, Gilles Hilary, and K.C. John Wei, “The Role 
of Anchoring Bias in the Equity Market: Evidence from 
Analysts’ Earnings Forecasts and Stock Returns.” Journal of 
Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 2013, Vol. 48(1): 47–76.
9. Kamdar, A., Levitt, S. D., List, J. A., Mullaney, B., and 
Syverson, C. (2015). “Once and Done: Leveraging Behavioral 
Economics to Increase Charitable Contributions.” In SPI 
Working Paper.
10. See Karlan, Tantia, and Welch (2019). “Behavioral 
Economics and Donor Nudges: Impulse or Deliberation?” 
Stanford Social Innovation Review. Retrieved from https://
ssir.org/articles/entry/behavioral_economics_and_donor_
nudges_impulse_or_deliberation 
11. Andreoni, J. (2015). “Warm Glow and Donor-Advised 
Funds: Insights from Behavioral Economics.” Boston 
College of Law Conference Papers. Retrieved from 
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/philanthropyforum/
donoradvised2015/papers/4/ 
12. See Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein (2008). Nudge: 
Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth, and Happiness.  
New Haven: Yale University Press.
13. Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein (2003). “Libertarian 
Paternalism.” American Economic Review, Vol. 93, No. 2: 
175–179.
                                                                                                                                                        C A R S E Y  S C H O O L  O F  P U B L I C  P O L I C Y       7
 
The Carsey School of Public Policy at the University of New Hampshire is nationally recognized for 
its research, policy education, and civic engagement. The school takes on pressing public issues with 
unbiased, accessible, and rigorous research; builds the policy and political problem-solving skills of its 
students; and brings people together for thoughtful dialogue and practical problem-solving.
Huddleston Hall • 73 Main Street • Durham, NH 03824
(603) 862-2821 TTY Users: dial 7-1-1 
or 1-800-735-2964 (Relay N.H.)
carsey.unh.edu
Carsey School of Public Policy
®
